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Abstract
In this paper, we study the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in synchronous distributed message
passing systems. The lattice agreement problem [2] in crash failure model has been studied both in
synchronous and asynchronous systems [2, 10, 24, 23], which leads to the current best upper bound
of O(log f) rounds both in synchronous and asynchronous systems. Its applications in building
linearizable replicated state machines has also been further explored recently in [10, 20, 23]. However,
very few algorithmic results are known for the lattice agreement problem in Byzantine failure model.
The paper [18] first gives an algorithm for a variant of the lattice agreement problem on cycle-free
lattices that tolerates up to f < n/(h(X) + 1) Byzantine faults, where n is the number of processes
and h(X) is the height of the input lattice X. The recent preprint [8] studies this problem in
asynchronous systems and slightly modifies the validity condition of the original lattice agreement
problem [2] in order to accommodate extra values sent from Byzantine processes. They present a
O(f) rounds algorithm by using the reliable broadcast primitive as a first step and following the
similar algorithmic framework as in [10, 24].
In this paper, we propose two algorithms for the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in
synchronous systems. The first algorithm runs in min{3h(X) + 6, 6√f + 6}) rounds and takes
O(n2min{h(X),√f}) messages, where h(X) is the height of the input lattice X, n is the total
number of processes in the system and f is the maximum number of Byzantine processes such that
n ≥ 3f + 1. The second algorithm takes logn+ 1 rounds and O(n2 logn) messages. In both our
algorithms, we apply a slightly modified version of the Gradecast algorithm [11] as a building block.
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1 Introduction
The lattice agreement problem, introduced in [2], is an important decision problem in shared-
memory and message passing systems. In this problem, processes start with input values
from a lattice and need to decide values which are comparable to each other. Specifically,
suppose each process i has input xi from a lattice (X, ≤, unionsq) with the partial order ≤ and
the join operation unionsq, it has to output a value yi also in X such that the following properties
are satisfied.
1) Downward-Vaility: xi ≤ yi for each correct process i.
2) Upward-Validity: yi ≤ unionsq{xi | i ∈ [n]}.
3) Comparability: for any two correct processes i and j, either yi ≤ yj or yj ≤ yi.
In shared-memory systems, algorithms for the lattice agreement problem can be directly
applied to solve the atomic snapshot problem [1, 2]. This was the initial motivation for
studying this problem. The application of lattice agreement in message passing systems has
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been explored only recently. Failero et al [10] were the first to apply lattice agreement for
building a special class of linearizable replicated state machines, which can support query
operation and update operation, but not mixed query and update operation. Traditionally,
consensus based protocols are applied to build linearizable replicated state machines. However,
consensus based protocols do not provide termination guarantee in the presence of failures
in the system, since the consensus problem cannot be solved with even one failure in an
asynchronous system [12]. The lattice agreement instead has been shown to be a weaker
decision problem than consensus. It can be solved in an asynchronous system when a
majority of processes is correct. Thus, linearizable replicated state machines built based on
lattice agreement protocols have the advantage of termination even with failures. Another
application of lattice agreement in distributed systems is to build atomic snapshot objects.
Efficient implementation of atomic snapshot objects in crash-prone asynchronous message
passing systems is important because they can make design of algorithms in such systems
easier (examples of algorithms in message passing systems based on snapshot objects can
be found in [22],[19] and [3]). The paper [2] presents a general technique for applying
algorithms for the lattice agreement problem to solve the atomic snapshot problem. By
using the exact same technique, algorithms for lattice agreement problem in distributed
systems can be directly applied to implement atomic snapshot objects in crash-prone message
passing systems. Essentially, an atomic snapshot object needs to provide linearizabilty for
all processes, which basically decides on some total ordering of operations. In the lattice
agreement problem, processes need to output values which lie in a chain of the input lattice,
which is also a total ordering.
It has been shown that the lattice agreement problem is a weaker decision problem than
consensus in the crash-failure model. In synchronous systems, consensus cannot be solved
in fewer than f + 1 rounds [9], but lattice agreement can be solved in log f rounds [24].
In asynchronous systems, the consensus problem cannot be solved even with one failure
[12], whereas the lattice agreement problem can be solved in asynchronous systems when a
majority of processes is correct [10]. In asynchronous systems with Byzantine failures, the
recent preprint [8] has shown that the lattice agreement problem, with a slightly modified
Upward-Validity definition, can be solved in O(f) rounds, whereas Byzantine consensus
cannot be solved even with one failure [16]. For synchronous systems, we show in this work
that the Byzantine lattice agreement problem can be solved in O(
√
f) rounds and O(logn)
rounds. Byzantine consensus, however, cannot be solved in fewer than f + 1 rounds [9],
where f is the maximum number of Byzantine processes in the system such that n ≥ 3f + 1.
Our main contribution in this paper is summarized as below.
I Theorem 1. There is a min{3h(X) + 6, 6√f + 6}) rounds early stopping algorithm for
the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in synchronous systems, which can tolerate f < n3
Byzantine failures. The term h(X) is the height of the input lattice X. The algorithm takes
O(n2min{h(X),√f}) messages.
I Theorem 2. There is a 3 logn+ 3 rounds algorithm for the Byzantine lattice agreement
problem in synchronous systems which can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine failures, where n is the
number of processes in the system. The algorithm takes O(n2 logn) messages.
1.1 Related Work
The lattice agreement problem in crash failure model has been studied both in synchronous
and asynchronous systems.
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In synchronous systems, a logn rounds recursive algorithm based on “branch-and-bound”
approach is proposed in [2] with message complexity of O(n2). The basic idea of their
algorithm is to divide processes into two groups based on ids and let processes in the first
group send values to processes in the second group. Each process in the second group
takes join of received values. Then, this procedure continues within each subgroup. Their
algorithm can tolerate at most n− 1 process failures. Later, the paper [17] gave an algorithm
with round complexity of min{1 + h(L), b(3 + √8f + 1/2)c}, for any execution where at
most f < n processes may crash and h(L) denotes the height of the input lattice L. Their
algorithm has the early-stopping property and is the first algorithm with round complexity
that depends on the actual height of the input lattice. The best upper bound for the lattice
agreement problem in crash-failure model is given by the paper [24], which is O(log f) rounds.
The basic idea of their algorithm is again to divide processes into two groups and trying to
achieve agreement within each group recursively. But their criterion for dividing groups is
based on the height of a value in the input lattice instead of process ids as in [2].
In asynchronous systems, the lattice agreement problem was first studied by Faleiro et
al in [10]. They present a Paxos style protocol when a majority of processes are correct.
Their algorithm needs O(n) asynchronous round in the worst case. The basic idea of their
algorithm is to let each process repeatedly broadcasts its current value to all at each round
and update its value to be the join of all received values until all received values at a certain
round are comparable with its current value. Later, Xiong et al in [24] proposes an algorithm
which improves the round complexity to be O(f) rounds. For the best upper bound, the
paper [23] presents an algorithm for this problem with round complexity of O(log f), which
applies similar idea as [24] but with extra work to take care of possible arbitrary delay of
messages in asynchronous systems.
The Byzantine failure model was first considered in [16] during the study of the Byzantine
general problem. For the lattice agreement problem in Byzantine failure model, the paper
[18] gives an algorithm for a variant of the lattice agreement problem on cycle-free lattices
that tolerates up to f < n(h(X)+1) Byzantine faults, where h(X) is the height of the input
lattice X. In their problem, the original Downward-Vality and Upward-Validity requirement
are replaced with a quite different validity definition, which only requires that for each output
value y of a correct process, there must be some input value x of a correct process such that
x ≤ y. With their validity definition, however, corresponding algorithms are not suitable
for applications in atomic snapshot objects and linearizable replicated state machines, since
each process would like to have their proposal value included its output value. A more
closely related work is the preprint [8], which proposes a reasonable validity condition and
presents the first algorithm for asynchronous systems. Their algorithm takes O(f) rounds.
The basic idea of their algorithm is to first use the asynchronous Byzantine reliable broadcast
primitive [6, 21] to let all correct processes disclose their input values to each other, based
on which each correct process constructs a set of safe values. This set of safe values are
the only values a correct process will possibly deliver in future rounds. After the disclosure
phase, the remaining steps are similar to the algorithms given in [10, 24] for the lattice
agreement problem in crash failure model, except that each process only deliver a message if
all the values included in it are contained in its safe value set. Both the above two papers
consider asynchronous systems. For synchronous systems with Byzantine failures, however,
no algorithms have been proposed, which is the primary goal of this paper.
For related works on application of lattice agreement, the paper [10] gives procedures
to build a linearizable and serializable replicated state machine which only supports query
operation and update operation but not mixed query-update operation, based on lattice
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agreement protocols. Later, the paper [23] proposes some optimizations for their procedure
for implementing replicated state machines in practice, specifically, they proposed a method to
truncate the logs maintained. They also implemented a simple replicated state machine using
their optimized protocols and compare it with S-Paxos [5], which is a java implementation of
Paxos [14, 15], and demonstrate better throughput and latency in some settings. The recent
paper [20] improves the procedure given in [10] in terms of memory consumption, at the
expense of progress, and high throughput is demonstrated.
2 System Model and Problem Definition
2.1 System Model
We assume a distributed message passing system with n processes in a completely connected
topology, denoted as p1, ..., pn. Every process can send messages to every other process. We
consider synchronous systems, which means that message delays and the duration of the
operations performed by the process have an upper bound on the time. We assume that
processes can have Byzantine failures but at most f < n/3 processes can be Byzantine in any
execution of the algorithm. Byzantine processes can deviate arbitrarily from the algorithm.
We say a process is correct or non-faulty if it is not a Byzantine process. We assume that
the underlying communication system is reliable but the message channel may not be FIFO.
In our algorithms, when a process sends a message to all, it also sends the message to itself.
2.2 The Byzantine Lattice Agreement Problem
Let (X, ≤, unionsq) be a finite join semi-lattice with the partial order ≤ and the join operation unionsq.
Two values u and v in X are comparable iff u ≤ v or v ≤ u. The join of u and v is denoted
as unionsq{u, v}. X is a join semi-lattice if a join exists for every nonempty finite subset of X. As
customary in this area, we use the term lattice instead of join semi-lattice in this paper for
simplicity.
In the Byzantine lattice agreement problem, each process pi can propose a value xi
in X and must decide on some output yi also in X with the presence of at most f Byz-
antine processes in the system. Let C denote the set of correct processes. An algorithm
is said to solve the Byzantine lattice agreement problem if the following properties are satisfied:
Comparability: For all i ∈ C and j ∈ C, either yi ≤ yj or yj ≤ yi.
Downward-Validity: For all i ∈ C, xi ≤ yi.
Non-Triviality: unionsq{yi | i ∈ C} ≤ unionsq({xi | i ∈ C} ∪B), where B ⊂ X and |B| ≤ f .
I Remark 3. The Non-Triviality is adopted from the definition of the Byzantine lattice
agreement problem in asynchronous systems studied in [8], which is similar to the Upward-
Validity given in [2]. The Upward-Validity in [2] is not suitable anymore with the presence
of Byzantine processes, since the input value for a Byzantine process is not defined. Thus,
the extra B set is used to accommodate for possible values from Byzantine processes.
In this paper, for a given set V ⊆ X, we use L(V ) to denote the join-closed subset of X that
includes all elements in V . Clearly, L(V ) is also a join semi-lattice. The height of a value v
in a lattice X is defined as the length of longest chain from any minimal value to v, denoted
as hX(v) or h(v) when it is clear. The height of a lattice X is the height of its largest value
in this lattice, denoted as h(X). For two lattices L1 and L2, we use L1 ⊆ L2 to mean that
L1 is a sublattice of L2.
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3 O(
√
f) Rounds Algorithm for Byzantine Lattice Agreement
In this section, we present our algorithm for the Byzantine lattice agreement problem, which
applies a slightly modified version of the Gradecast algorithm [11] as a building block. Our
algorithm has two primary ingredients which are quite different from the algorithm given in
[10, 24] for the crash failure model. In the Byzantine failure model, correct processes can
receive arbitrary values from a Byzantine process. In order to guarantee Non-Triviality,
we do not want correct processes to accept arbitrarily many values sent from a Byzantine
process. The idea in [18] is to construct a safe value set, which stores the values reliably
broadcast by each process at the first round. Later on, each process only delivers a received
message if the values included in this message are contained in its safe value set. In this way,
correct processes would not deliver arbitrary values sent by Byzantine processes. However,
this idea can only provides O(f) rounds guarantee. To obtain the O(
√
f) rounds guarantee,
each correct process in our algorithm keeps track of a lattice, which we call the safe lattice,
instead of just a set of values. At each round, each correct process ignore all values received
which are not contained in this safe lattice. By carefully updating this safe lattice of each
correct process, our algorithm ensures that the value sent from a correct process is always in
the safe lattice of any other correct process and Byzantine process cannot introduce arbitrary
values to break the Non-Triviality condition. This difference turns out to be the key to get
the O(
√
f) round complexity.
To get the O(
√
f) bound, another crucial ingredient of our algorithm is to apply the
Gradecast algorithm at each round to detect the Byzantine processes which sends different
values to different correct processes and let each correct process ignores messages from these
processes. This idea is used in [4] to solve the Byzantine consensus problem in synchronous
systems. Let us now first look at the modified Gradecast algorithm.
3.1 The Modified Gradecast Algorithm
Gradecast [11] is a three-round distributed algorithm that ensures some properties that are
similar to those of broadcast. Specifically, in Gradecast there is a leader process p that sends
a value v to all other processes. The output of process i is a pair < p, vip, cip > where vip is the
value process i thinks the leader p has sent and cip is the score assigned by i for the leader.
A higher score indicates a higher confidence regarding the correctness of the leader. We
say cip is the score assigned to the value or the leader by process i. The original Gradecast
algorithm in [11] has the following properties.
1. If the leader p is non-faulty then vip = v and cip = 2, for any non-faulty i;
2. For every non-faulty i and j: if cip > 0 and cjp > 0 then vip = vjp;
3. |cip − cjp| ≤ 1 for every non-faulty i and j.
For our purpose, we do a slight modification of the Gradecast algorithm from [11] to
enable processes to filter out some invalid values received. For completeness, we present the
modified Gradecast algorithm in Fig 1. The only modification we do is to let each process
store a lattice and filter out all received values which are not in the lattice. We call this
lattice — the safe lattice.
Each process keeps a safe value set, denoted as SV , which is updated at each round of the
main algorithm. From SV , each process constructs the safe lattice as the join-closed subset of
X which includes all values in SV , i.e, L(SV ). The Gradecast procedure has two parameters.
The first one specifies the leader of the Gradecast and the second one represents the value that
the leader would like to send. When the leader invokes the Gradecast algorithm, all nonfaulty
processes participate in a correct manner. While executing the Gradecast algorithm, each
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Gradecast(q, vq):
Each process p keeps track of a safe value set SVp
and a safe lattice L(SVp): the join-closes subsets of X including SVp
Each process p ignores values received which do not belong to L(SVp)
Each process p uses Bp to store Byzantine processes known to p
Each process p ignores messages received from processes in Bp
Round 1:
Leader q sends vq to all
Each process p executes the following steps
Round 2:
p sends the value received from q to all
Let < j, vj > denote p received vj from j
Let maj be a value received the most among such values
Let #maj be the number of occurrences of maj
Round 3:
if #maj ≥ n− f
p sends maj to all
endif
Let < j, vj > denote that p received vj from j
Let maj′ be a value received the most among such values
Let #maj′ be the number of occurrences of maj′
/* Grading */
if #maj′ ≥ n− f
set vp := maj′ and cp := 2
elif #maj′ ≥ f + 1
set vp := maj′ and cp := 1
else
set vp := ⊥ and cp := 0
endif
Return < q, vp, cp >
Figure 1 Gradecast Algorithm
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correct process ignores messages sent by processes in its bad set and ignores all received
values which are not in L(SV ). At round 1 of Gradecast, the leader broadcasts its value to
all. At round 2, each process sends the value received from the leader if it is valid to all. At
round 3, each process computes the most frequent value received at round 2 and sends this
value to all if its frequency is at least n− f . Then, each process performs the grading step.
It again computes the most frequent value received at round 3. If this value has frequency at
least n− f , then it grades this leader with score 2 and sets the corresponding value to be
the most frequent one. Otherwise, if the frequency is at least f + 1, it grades the leader with
score 1 and sets the corresponding value to be the most frequent value received at round 3.
Otherwise, it grades the leader with score 0 and sets the value to be null denoted by ⊥.
First assume that a correct leader always gradecast some value which lies in the safe
lattice of each correct process and the bad set of each correct process does not contain
any correct process. We will show that these assumptions are satisfied when we invoke the
modified Gradecast algorithm as a substep in our main algorithm.
I Lemma 4. If we assume that a correct leader always gradecast some value which lies in
the safe lattice of each other correct process and the bad set of each correct process does not
contain a correct process, then the modified Gradecast algorithm satisfies all properties of
Gradecast.
Proof. Proof of property 2 and 3 is exactly the same as the proof of the original Gradecast
algorithm. Let us look at property 1. Since we assume that the value of a correct process is
in the safe lattice of each other correct process and a correct process is not in any bad set,
then no correct process would ignore its value. Therefore, in the grading phase, each correct
process will grade a correct leader with score 2 and deliver the same value from the correct
leader. J
The main algorithm, shown in Fig 2, runs in synchronous rounds. For ease of presentation,
we use rounds to mean the iterations in the for loop of the main algorithm. We call the
rounds taken by the Gradecast step as sub-rounds. In the main algorithm, each process i
keeps track of a bad set Bi, which contains all the Byzantine processes process i has known.
Each process which is graded with score at most 1 by process i in some Gradecast step is
included into Bi. Each process also keeps track of a set of safe values SVi from which the safe
lattice is constructed. Initially, SVi is empty and each process accepts any received values at
the first round. We assume for now that there is an upper bound F on the number of rounds
of the main algorithm. We will establish the accurate value of F when we analyze the round
complexity. At each round, each process invokes the Gradecast algorithm with its current
value and acts as the leader. So there are at least n− f Gradecast instances running at each
round, with each instance corresponding to one correct process. After the Gradecast phase,
each correct process i has a set of triplets, one for each process which invoked Gradecast as
the leader. A triplet consists of the leader id, the value sent by the leader, and the score
assigned by i. From these triplets, each correct processes i updates its bad set and safe set
as follows. Each correct i includes all processes which are assigned score at most one into its
bad set Bi and ignores all messages sent from processes in Bi at future rounds. Process i
also updates its safe value set SVi to be the union of all values gradecast by processes with
score at least one. By updating the safe value set in such way, we can ensure that the current
value of a correct process must be in the safe lattice of any other correct process. Thus, the
value gradecast by a correct process in the next round is valid for any other correct process,
which implies property 1 of Gradecast. On the other hand, this safe value set also prevents
Byzantine processes from gradecasting an arbitrary value, i.e, Byzantine processes can only
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Algorithm for Process i:
vi := xi //value held by i during the algorithm
decided := false // deciding status
Bi := ∅ //set of faulty processes known
SVi := ∅ //set of safe values
F // an upper bound on the number of rounds
yi := ⊥ // output value
1: for r := 1 to F
2: Gradecast(i, vi)
3: Let < j, vj , cj > denote that process j gradecast vj with score cj
4: Let G denote the set of all such triplets.
5: Set Bi := Bi ∪ {j | < j, ∗, cj > ∈ G ∧ cj ≤ 1}
6: Set SVi := ∪{vj | < j, vj , cj > ∈ G ∧ cj ≥ 1}
7: if vi is comparable with each value in {vj | < j, vj , cj > ∈ G ∧ cj = 2} and
decided = false
8: yi := vi
9: decided = true
10: end
11: Set vi := unionsq{vj | < j, vj , cj > ∈ G ∧ cj = 2}
12: r := r + 1
13:endfor
Figure 2 O(
√
f) Rounds Algorithm for the Byzantine Lattice Agreement Problem
gradecast values that belong to the safe lattice. We explain this in details in our proof for
correctness.
For the deciding condition, each process decides on its current value at a certain round
if all values gradecast by processes with score 2 are comparable with its current value. A
process keeps executing the algorithm even if it has decided. It updates its current value to
be the join of all values gradecast with score 2 and starts the next round.
3.2 Proof of Correctness
We now prove the correctness of our algorithm. Let vri denote the value held by i at the end
of round r. Let vr denote the join of all values held by all correct processes at the end of
round r, i.e, vr = unionsq{vri | i ∈ C}. Let SV ri denote the safe value set held by i at the end
of round r. Let Sr denote the union of all safe value sets held by correct processes at the
end of round r, i.e, Sr = ∪{SV ri | i ∈ C}. Let svr denote the join of all values in Sr, i.e,
svr = unionsq{v | v ∈ Sr}. We use cij to denote the score process i assigned to process j in the
Gradecast instance with j as the leader. The main algorithm has the following properties.
Property (p1) and (p8) immediately justify the assumption in Lemma 4. Thus, all properties
of Gradecast are satisfied.
I Lemma 5. Let i and j be any two correct processes. For any round 1 ≤ r ≤ F , the main
algorithm satisfies the following properties.
(p1) vri ∈ L(SV rj )
(p2) vr ∈ L(SV ri )
(p3) vr ≤ svr
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(p4) vr−1i < vri if i is undecided at the end of round r
(p5) vr < vr+1 if at least one correct process is not decided at the end of round r
(p6) L(Sr+1) ⊆ L(Sr)
(p7) svr+1 ≤ svr
(p8) For each correct process i, its bad set Bi never contains a correct process
Proof. (p1): By the algorithm, vri is the join of all values gradecast with score 2 at round r.
Consider an arbitrary value v gradecast by some process t with assigned score 2 by i at round
r, i.e, cit = 2. Then, by property 3 of Gradecast, we have c
j
t ≥ 1. Hence, from line 6 of the
main algorithm, we have v ∈ SV rj . Since v is some arbitrary value, we have vri ∈ L(SV rj ).
(p2)-(p3): Immediately implied by (p1).
(p4): By the deciding condition, if i is not decided at the end of round r, then it must receive
at least one value which is incomparable with its current value. After taking joins, its new
value must be greater than its old value.
(p5): Immediately implied by (p4).
(p6): Suppose L(Sr+1) 6⊆ L(Sr), then there must be some value v gradecast by some process
b at round r + 1 such that v ∈ L(Sr+1) ∧ v 6∈ L(Sr). Then, we have v 6∈ L(SV ri ) for any
correct i. However, in the Gradecast step at round r, for any correct process i, all received
values which are not in L(SV ri ) are ignored. Thus, each correct process grades value v sent
by b with score 0. Thus, no correct process will include v into their safe value set. Therefore,
v 6∈ SV r+1i for any correct i, a contradiction to v ∈ L(Sr+1).
(p7): Immediately implied by (p6).
(p8): Proof by induction on the round number r.
Base case (r = 1). At the first round, the safe lattice of each correct process is empty and
each process accepts any message from any process. Then, by the Gradecast algorithm, the
value of a correct leader will be graded with score 2. Thus, the bad set of each correct process
does no contain a correct process.
Induction case: Assume that the property holds for all rounds before round r. At round r,
since each correct leader is not in the bad set of any correct process, its value will be graded
with score 2. Thus, it will not be included in a bad set of any correct process. J
I Remark 6. Property (p6) shows that the whole safe lattice shrinks or remain the same as
round increases. This is not generally true for the safe lattice stored at an individual correct
process. For a correct process i, there could exist a value such that enough correct processes
include it into their safe value set but i does not. Then, it is possible for a correct process to
grade this value with score at least 1 in the next round and includes it into its safe value set.
I Corollary 7. For any correct i, its bad set Bi never contains a correct process.
Proof. Immediate from property 1 of Gradecast and line 5 of the main algorithm. J
Now we are ready to show the correctness of our algorithm.
I Lemma 8. (Comparability) For any two correct processes i and j, either yi ≤ yj or yj ≤ yi.
Proof. Let processes i and j decide at the rounds ri and rj respectively. Assume ri ≤ rj ,
without loss of generality. Consider the following two cases.
Case 1: ri = rj . By the deciding condition, yi must comparable with yj .
Case 2: ri < rj . Ar round ri, the decided value of i must be received by process j with
score 2, by property 1 of Gradecast. Since j does not decide at this round, it must take join
of the decided value of i. Thus, yi ≤ yj . J
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I Lemma 9. (Downward-validity) The values decided by correct processes satisfies Downward-
validity.
Proof. Immediate from property (p4) of lemma 5. J
To show Non-Triviality and analyze the round complexity, we first introduce the notion
of terrible process as below.
I Definition 10. A process is terrible at a certain round if it is graded with score 2 by at
least one correct process in each previous round and no correct process grades it with score 2
in the current round.
I Corollary 11. Each terrible process at a certain round is included into Bi for any correct i.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of a terrible process and line 5 of the main algorithm.
J
The lemma below ensures that correct processes would not include different values from
a same terrible process into their safe sets.
I Lemma 12. For any round r, Sr contains at most one value gradecast by a terrible process
at round r.
Proof. Each correct process grades the terrible process with score 1 or 0, by definition of
terrible process. Each correct process i only includes a value into its safe value set SV ri if
the score of that value is at least 1. Suppose Sr contains two different values vb and ub from
a terrible process b. Then there are two correct processes i and j such that i includes vb into
SV ri and j includes ub into SV rj . Both values are graded with score 1, which contradicts
property 2 of Gradecast. J
I Corollary 13. For any round r, Sr contains at most one value gradecast by each process
at round r.
For now we assume that each process decides within F rounds. We will obtain the
accurate value of F when we analyze the round complexity.
I Lemma 14. (Non-Triviality) The values decided by correct processes satisfies Non-
Triviality.
Proof. From property (p3) and (p7) of lemma 5, we have that unionsq{yi | i ∈ C} ≤ vF ≤ svF ≤
sv1. To bound sv1, from corollary 13, we know that S1 contains at most f extra values
not from correct processes, since there are at most f Byzantine processes. Then, we have
sv1 ≤ unionsq({xi | i ∈ C} ∪B) for some B ⊂ X and |B| ≤ f . Hence, unionsq{yi | i ∈ C} ≤ unionsq({xi | i ∈
C} ∪B) for some B ⊂ X and |B| ≤ f . J
3.3 Complexity Analysis
We now analyze the complexity of our algorithm. We first show that the value of a correct
process at a later round is at least the join of all values of correct processes in a previous
round.
I Lemma 15. For any round r and correct process i, vr ≤ vr+1i .
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Proof. Since vr = unionsq{vrj | j ∈ C}, each vrj is gradecast by correct process j to all at round
r + 1 and by property 1 of Gradecast, process i grades j with score 2. Hence, process i will
take join of vrj for any correct j, which implies vr ≤ vr+1i . J
The following lemma along with property (p5) and (p7) of lemma 5 guarantees the
termination of our algorithm.
I Lemma 16. If vr = svr at the end of some round r, then all undecided correct processes
decide in at most 2 rounds.
Proof. Consider round r + 1, for each correct i, we have vr ≤ vr+1i from lemma 15 and
vr+1i ≤ svr+1 ≤ svr from property (p1) and (p7). Since vr = svr, we must have vr = vr+1i =
svr for each correct i. Then, at round r + 2, each valid value received by i must be less than
or equal to its current value, since its current value vr = svr is the largest value in the whole
safe lattice. Thus, the deciding condition is satisfied. J
I Lemma 17. F ≤ h(X) + 2, where X is the input lattice and h(X) is the height of X.
Proof. From property (p7) of lemma 5, the height of svr in lattice X, is non-increasing as r
increases, whereas from property (p5), the height of vr in lattice X is strictly increasing if
there is at least one undecided process as r increases. Along with property (p3) of lemma
5, which shows that vr ≤ svr, we must have vr = svr in at most h(X) rounds. By lemma
16, after h(X) rounds, all undecided processes decide in at most 2 more rounds. Thus,
F ≤ h(X) + 2. J
We now move on to show the O(
√
f) round guarantee. The lemma below shows that if
a bad process is included into the bad sets of all processes, its value would never be taken
into consideration by correct processes in future rounds, i.e., these processes are completely
ignored by all correct processes.
I Lemma 18. For any process b ∈ ∩{Bi | i ∈ C} at any round, each correct process grades
b with score 0 in the Gradecast instance with b as the leader in this round.
Proof. In the Gradecast algorithm, all correct processes ignore values sent by processes in
their bad sets. J
The lemma below along with lemma 18 shows that if a process is terrible at a certain
round, it cannot be terrible anymore in later rounds.
I Lemma 19. For any round r, all terrible processes at this round are included into the bad
set Bi of each correct i.
Proof. By the definition of the terrible process, the score assigned by each correct process
must be less than or equal to 1. Then, each correct process includes the terrible process in
its bad set. J
Let Lr denote the lattice formed by the safe value set at the end of round r, i.e, Lr = L(Sr).
I Lemma 20. Suppose there are fr terrible processes at round r, then each process decides
within r + fr + 2 rounds.
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Proof. We first show that hLr(svr) − hLr(vr) ≤ fr. Consider a value v gradecast by a
terrible process b at round r and is included into the safe value set of some correct process
i. Then, we have cib = 1. By definition of terrible process, for any other correct process
j, we have either cjb = 1 or c
j
b = 0. In the first case, by property 2 of Gradecast, we must
have vjb = vib = v. For the second case, j would not include the value from b into its safe
value set. Thus, each terrible process can introduce at most one value into the whole safe
value set. The difference between V r and SV r is at most the values gradecast by terrible
processes at round r. Since vr is the join of values in V r and svr is the join of values in SV r,
we must have hLr (svr)− hLr (vr) ≤ fr. On the other hand, from property (p5) of lemma 5,
we have hLr (vt+1) > hLr (vt) for any round t ≥ r. From property (p7) of lemma 5, we have
hLr(svt+1) ≤ hLr(svt) for any round t ≥ r. Thus, we must that hLr(vr+k) = hLr(svr+k)
for some k ≤ fr. Along with property (p3), we have that vr+k = svr+k for some number
k ≤ fr. Then, by lemma 16, all undecided correct processes decide within at most 2 rounds.
Therefore, each correct process decides within r + fr + 2 rounds. J
I Remark 21. From the proof of lemma 20, we can see that the crucial point of proving this
lemma lies in the height difference between svr and vr is at most fr in a round r with at
most fr terrible processes. If we simply store a safe value set instead of the safe lattice, this
claim does not hold anymore.
I Lemma 22. F ≤ 2√f + 2, where f is the maximum number of Byzantine failures in the
system such that n ≥ 3f + 1.
Proof. Let us consider the first
√
f rounds, at least one of these rounds has less than
√
f
terrible processes by lemma 19. By lemma 20, starting from that round, each undecided
process needs at most
√
f + 2 more rounds to decide. Thus, the total number of rounds is at
most 2
√
f + 2. J
3.4 Early Stopping
We say an algorithm has the early stopping property if its running time depends on the actual
number of Byzantine processes during an execution of the algorithm. To obtain the early
stopping property, we let each correct process dynamically update its termination round,
which denotes the round number such that a correct process terminates the algorithm in any
case. Let ti denote the termination round of the correct process i, initially set to be F . The
value of ti is updated at each round in the following way. Consider a round r. Suppose kri
processes are included into the bad set of i at this round, then we set ti := min{ti, r+kri +2}.
Suppose we have k actual Byzantine processes during an execution of the algorithm. Consider
the first
√
k rounds for an arbitrary correct process i, there must be a round r′ such that at
most
√
k processes are included into the bad set of i, then the termination round is at most
r′ +
√
k+ 2. Thus, the termination round of i is at most 2
√
k+ 2. Since the above argument
applies for any correct process, all correct process must terminate in at most 2
√
k+2 rounds.
I Theorem 1. There is a min{3h(X) + 6, 6√f + 6}) rounds early stopping algorithm for
the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in synchronous systems, which can tolerate f < n3
Byzantine failures. The term h(X) is the height of the input lattice X. The algorithm takes
O(n2min{h(X),√f}) messages.
Proof. The round complexity follows from lemma 17 and 22 and the fact that the Gradecast
step takes 3 sub-rounds. For message complexity, each Gradecast instance takes O(n2)
messages. Since we have at most n Gradecast instance at each round, each round takes
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O(n3) messages in total. Thus, the total number of messages is O(n3min{h(X),√f}).
By combining messages of different instances of Gradecast, the message complexity for n
instances of Gradecast can be reduced from O(n3) to O(n2). Each message is a vector
corresponding to n instances of Gradecast. The message size can be reduced from O(n) to
O(f) using techniques based on error correcting codes as shown in [7]. J
I Corollary 23. There is a min{4h(X) + 8, 8√f + 8} rounds algorithm for the authenticated
Byzantine lattice agreement problem in synchronous systems, which can tolerate f < n2
Byzantine failures. The algorithm takes O(n2min{h(X),√f}) messages.
Proof. The paper [13] presents a 4-round Gradecast algorithm in the authenticated setting
with f failures such that n ≥ 2f + 1, which also guarantees the three properties of gradecast.
Then, we can modify this 4-round Gradecast algorithm in the authenticated setting in the
same way as in the general setting. The main algorithm simply applies this modified 4-round
Gradecast algorithm as a building block. The correctness proof remains the same. The time
complexity is straightforward. J
4 3 log n+ 3 Rounds Algorithm for Byzantine Lattice Agreement
The 3 logn + 3 round algorithm shown in this section is inspired by algorithms proposed
for crash failure model in [2, 24, 24]. The basic idea is to apply a Classifier procedure to
divide a group of processes into two subgroups: the slave group and the master group, and
ensure the property that the value of any correct process in the slave group is less than the
value of any correct process in the master group. Recursively, we can apply the Classifier
procedure in each subgroup. Eventually, all correct processes have comparable values. In
the Byzantine failure model, however, simply ensuring the above property is not enough.
For example, suppose we divided a group of processes G into S(G) and M(G) such that the
above property is satisfied. Suppose there is a Byzantine process in S(G), it might send a
value to some correct process in S(G) in a later round such that the value is not known by
correct processes in M(G). Then, the above property is violated. In order to prevent such
cases, our algorithm introduces two novel important techniques. First, to bound Byzantine
processes to send arbitrary values, each process keeps track of a safe value set for each other
process and regards any value received from that process but not in the safe value set as
invalid. This is also different from the algorithm in last section, where each process just
keeps track of one single safe lattice for all. Second, we apply the Gradecast algorithm
to guarantee that the master group always dominates the slave group. The Gradecast
algorithm serves the same purpose as the Classifier procedure as given in [24] and [23]. A
nice property of the Gradecast algorithm is that if some correct process assigns score 2 for
the value gradecast by the leader, then each other correct process assigns score at least 1 for
this value. Suppose we let each process in a group gradecast its value. Let U2 denote the
set of values assigned score of 2 by some correct process. Let U1 denote the set of values
assigned score of at least 1 by some correct process. Then, we must have U2 ⊆ U1. If each
process in the master group updates their value to U1 and each process in the slave group
updates their value to U2, then it is guaranteed that the master group dominates slave group.
In the 3 logn+3 rounds algorithm, a process needs to gradecast a set of values instead of
just one single value. Thus, we first present the following SetGradecast algorithm, shown
in Fig. 3, which is similar to the Gradecast algorithm in previous section, except that it is
used to gradecast a set of values. In the logn+ 1 rounds algorithm, each process i keeps
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SetGradecast(q, V ):
V is a set of unique values to be gradecast by leader q.
Each process i keeps track of a safe array Si of size n with Si[j] storing a safe value set for j.
Process i regards a value received from j but not in Si[j] as invalid.
Each process ignores a set received if the set contains duplicate values
Round 1:
Leader q sends V to all
/* Each process p executes round 2 and round 3 */
Round 2:
/* Echo */
process p sends the set received from q if any to all with invalid values removed
Let < j, Vj > denote that p received Vj from j with invalid values removed
Define multiset U :=
n⋃
j=1
Vj
Process p constructs a set U ′ as follows
for each unique value v ∈ U
Let vf denote its frequency in U
Add v into U ′ if vf ≥ n− f
endfor
Round 3:
Process p sends U ′ to all
Let < j, Vj > represent that p received Vj from j with invalid values removed
Let U :=
n⋃
j=1
Vj
/* Grading */
Let R denote a set to be returned
for each value v ∈ U
Let vf denote its frequency in U
if vf ≥ n− f
set cpv := 2, add v into R
elif vf ≥ f + 1
cpv := 1, add v into R
else
cpv := 0
endif
endfor
Let Cp denote the map storing the score for each value v ∈ R, i.e., Cp[v] = cpv.
Return< q,R,Cp >
Figure 3 The SetGradecast Algorithm
X. Zheng, and V.K. Garg XX:15
track of a safe array Si of size n with Si[j] being a safe value set for process j. For different
processes j and j′, Si[j] and Si[j′] might be different. This is different from the algorithm in
last section, where each process keeps track of a safe lattice. Process i considers a value v
received from process j as valid if v ∈ Si[j], otherwise invalid. Process i uses Si to filter out
invalid values received from any other process in the SetGradecast algorithm. We will show
how to construct and update the safe value array for each process in the main algorithm.
In the SetGradecast algorithm, we assume that the leader needs to gradecast a set of
distinct values, which can be guaranteed by introducing some unique tags for each value.
Similar to the Gradecast algorithm, a process in the SetGradecast algorithm needs to
send any valid value received at round 2 and round 3 with from at least n − f different
processes to all other processes.
Let v be an arbitrary value gradecast by the leader. Let civ denote the score of v assigned
by process i. Let SFi denote the union of the safe value set of each correct process for i, i.e.,
SFi = {Sj [i] | j ∈ C}.
I Lemma 24. Algorithm SetGradecast has the following properties.
1. If a value v gradecast by a correct leader i is in the safe value set of each correct
process j for i, i.e., v ∈ Sj [i] for any correct j, then the score of v assigned by each correct j
must be 2, i.e., cjv = 2.
2. Let v be an arbitrary value gradecast by the leader. Then |civ − cjv| ≤ 1 for any two
correct process i and j.
3. If a value v gradecast a leader i is not in the union of the safe value set of each correct
process for i, i.e., v 6∈ SFi, then cjv = 0 for each j ∈ C.
Proof. For property 1, since the leader is correct, it must send the same value v to each
process at round 1. Since v is contained in the safe value set of each correct process j for the
leader, then at round 2 each correct process j will receive v from each correct process. It
then sends v to each process at round 3. At round 3, each correct j receives v from each
correct process, thus the score of v assigned by each correct j must be 2.
For property 2, we only need to show that if any correct j has cjv = 2, then any other
correct process k must have ckv ≥ 1. Since j has cjv = 2, then process j must have received v
from at least n− f processes at round 3, which contains at least n− 2f correct processes.
Thus, for any other correct process k, it must have received v from at least n− 2f correct
processes, which is at least f + 1 by the assumption of n ≥ 3f + 1. Therefore, ckv ≥ 1.
For v to be assigned score at least 1 by a correct process j, process j has to receive this
value from at least f +1 different processes at round 3. Since each correct process j considers
any value from i but not in Sj [i] as invalid and there are at most f Byzantine processes, any
correct process can receive v from at most f different processes. Thus, it must be assigned
score of 0. J
The 3 logn + 3 rounds algorithm is shown in Fig. 4. In the algorithm, each process i
stores a value set Vi which is updated at each round. Initially, Vi = {xi}. Each process i
keeps track of a safe array Si of size n with Si[j] being the safe value set for j. Process i
regards any value received from j which is not in Si[j] as invalid and thus ignores it. Different
processes may have different safe value set for a process j. Initially, all processes are in the
same group, denoted as G1. During the algorithm, processes might be divided into different
groups. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
The initial round from line 1 to line 5 is used to build the initial safe array of each process
i. At this round, each process i invokes the Gradecast algorithm to send its input value to
all. Each process i constructs a same initial safe value set for each process j, which includes
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xi: input value for process i
Vi: value set of process i with Vi := {xi} initially.
Initially all process are within the same group G1
Let Gr denote the collection of groups at round r, initially G1 = {G1}
Let gr : [n]→ Gr be the function mapping a process to the group it belongs to at round r
Each process i keeps track of an array Si of size n with Si[j] being the safe value set for j.
At each round r, Si[j] is updated based on the values gradecast by processes in gr(j)
/* Build the Initial Safe Array */
1: for each process i, in parallel do
2: Process i invokes Gradecast(i, xi)
3: Let < j, vj , cj > denote that process j gradecasts vj with score cj
4: Set Si[k] := {vj | cj ≥ 1 ∧ j ∈ [n]} for any process k ∈ [n]
5: endfor
6: for r := 1 to logn
7: Divide each group G ∈ Gr into two groups: the slave group S(G) and the master group M(G)
8: Let G1r denote the collection of slave groups
9: Let G2r denote the collection of master groups
10: Set Gr+1 := G1r ∪ G2r
11: for each correct process i, in parallel do
12: if i is in the slave group
13: Process i invokes SetGradecast(i, Vi)
14: endif
15: Let < j, Vj , Cj > denote that process j gradecasts set Vj to process i with score map Cj
16: Let Rj denote the set of values gradecast by j with score 2, i.e, R2j := {v ∈ Vj | Cj [v] = 2}
17: for each group S(G) ∈ G1r /* slave groups */
18: Let M(G) denote the corresponding master group of S(G) in G2r .
19: Let U1 denote the set of values gradecast by some process in S(G) with score at least 1
with duplicates removed, i.e., U1 :=
⋃
j∈G
Vj
20: Let U2 denote the set of values gradecast by some process in S(G) with score 2 with
duplicates removed, i.e., U2 :=
⋃
j∈G
Rj
21: For each process j ∈ S(G), process i sets Si[j] := U2
22: For each process j ∈M(G), process i sets Si[j] := Si[j] ∪ U1
23: if i ∈ S(G)
24: Set Vi := U2
25: elif i ∈M(G)
26: updates Vi := Vi ∪ U1
27: endif
28: endfor
29: endfor
30: endfor
31: Output yi := unionsq{v ∈ Vi}
Figure 4 The 3 logn+ 3 Rounds Algorithm for the Byzantine Lattice Agreement Problem
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all values gradecast some process and assigned score of at least 1 by process i. We will show
later that this initial round of gradecast guarantees Non-Triviality of the Byzantine lattice
agreement problem. Intuitively, this is because each Byzantine process can only introduce
one value into the safe value sets by properties of Gradecast.
At each round r from 1 to logn, each group G is divided into two subgroups S(G) and
M(G), where S(G) contains all processes in G with ids in the lower half and M(G) contains
all processes in G with ids in the upper half. The following steps are performed within each
group G. Each process in S(G) invokes SetGradecast to gradecast its current value set to
all processes. Processes in M(G) do not gradecast their value sets. After this step, each
correct process i receives a set of values gradecast by processes in S(G). At line 21, process i
updates its safe value set for each process j ∈ S(G) to be the values gradecast with score 2 by
some process in S(G). At line 22, it updates the safe value set for each process in k ∈M(G)
to be the values gradecast with score at least 1 by some process in S(G). From line 23 to line
27, processes update their value sets. Each process in S(G) updates its value set to be the
set of values gradecast by some process in S(G) with score 2. Each process in M(G) updates
its value set to be the set of values gradecast by some process in M(G) with score at least 1.
Now we analyze the correctness and complexity of our algorithm. For any group G, let
S(G) and M(G) denote the slave group and the master group obtained when dividing G. Let
Sri denote the safe value array of i at the end of round r. Let SF rj be an auxiliary variable
which denotes the union of the safe value set of each correct process for j at the end of round
r, i.e., SF rj := {Sri [j] | i ∈ C}. Let V ri denote the set held by process i at the end of round
r. Let SF rG be an auxiliary variable which denotes the union of the safe value set of each
correct process for processes in group G at the end of round r, i.e., SF rG :=
⋃
j∈G
SF rj .
I Lemma 25. For any group G at round r and any two correct processes i and j such that
i ∈ S(G) and j ∈M(G), we have SF ri ⊆ V rj .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary value v ∈ SF ri , from line 21 of the algorithm, v must be
gradecast by some process in S(G) at round r and assigned score of 2 by some correct process.
By property 2 of the SetGradecast algorithm, the score of v assigned by any other process
must be at least 1. Specifically, the score of v assigned by process j must be at least 1, which
means v must be included into V rj by process j at line 26. J
The following lemma guarantees that if a value in the value set of a correct process is
contained in the safe value set of each correct process, then this value remains in the value
set of the correct process.
I Lemma 26. Consider an arbitrary value v ∈ V rj of correct process j. If it is contained in
Sri [j] for each correct process i, then we have
(1) v ∈ Sti [j] for each correct process i and t ≥ r.
(2) v ∈ V tj for any t ≥ r.
Proof. (1). By induction on the round number. For the base case t = r, the claim holds.
Consider round t > r and assume that (1) and (2) are satisfied for any round before t. In the
algorithm, Si[j] can only shrink at line 21 and Vj can only shrink at line 24, which happens
when process j is divided into the slave group at round t. Then Si[j] is updated to be the
set of values gradecast by some process in the group of j and assigned score of 2 by process i.
At round t, since v ∈ V t−1j in induction hypothesis, process j must gradecast value v. Since
v is in the safe value set of each correct i by induction hypothesis, we must have civ = 2 by
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property 1 of SetGradecast. Thus, v must be included into Si[j] by each correct i at line
21 and v must included into V tj at line 24 by process j. J
The following lemma guarantees that the safe value set of a correct process for a group
can only shrink.
I Lemma 27. Consider any group G which divides into S(G) and M(G) at round r, we
have SF rS(G) ⊆ SF r−1G and SF rM(G) ⊆ SF r−1G .
Proof. At round r, processes in group S(G) gradecast their values to all. Consider an
arbitrary value v ∈ SF rS(G), from line 21, we know that v must be gradecast by some process
in S(G) with score 2, which implies that value v must be in the safe value set for j of at
least n− 2f correct processes. Then, v must be in SF r−1G .
From line 22 of the algorithm, for an arbitrary process j ∈M(G), each correct process i
sets Si[j] := Si[j] ∪ U1G, with U1G being the set of values gradecast by some process in S(G)
and assigned score of at least 1 by i. Thus, any value v ∈ U1G must be in the safe set for j of
at least one correct process by property 3 of the SetGradecast algorithm. Then, v must be
in SF r−1G . Therefore, SF rM(G) ⊆ SF r−1G . J
I Corollary 28. For any groups G and G′ such that G ⊆ G′, we have SF tG ⊆ SF rG′ for any
t ≥ r.
I Lemma 29. (Comparability) For any two correct i and j, we have either yi ≤ yj or
yj ≤ yi.
Proof. We show either V logni ⊆ V lognj or V lognj ⊆ V logni . Let G denote the last group both
i and j belongs to. Let r be the round that G is divided into S(G) and M(G). Without
loss of generality, suppose i ∈ S(G) and j ∈ M(G). At round logn, i itself forms a group.
From corollary 28, we have V logni ⊆ SF logni ⊆ SF rS(G). Consider round r of the algorithm.
Consider an arbitrary value v ∈ SF rS(G). The value v must be gradecast by some process
in S(G) and assigned score 2 by some correct process by line 21 of the algorithm. That is,
there exists a correct process t with ctv = 2. Then, we have ckv ≥ 1 for any correct process k
by property 2 of the SetGradecast algorithm. Hence, v ∈ Srk[j] for any correct process k
by line 22 of the algorithm. Also, we have v ∈ V rj by line 24. By Lemma 26, we can derive
that v ∈ V lognj . Since v is an arbitrary value from SF rS(G), we must have SF rS(G) ⊆ V lognj .
Thus, V logni ⊆ V lognj . The case when j ∈ S(G) and i ∈ M(G), we can similar obtain
V lognj ⊆ V logni . J
I Theorem 2. There is a 3 logn+ 3 rounds algorithm for the Byzantine lattice agreement
problem in synchronous systems which can tolerate f < n3 Byzantine failures, where n is the
number of processes in the system. The algorithm takes O(n2 logn) messages.
Proof. Comparability follows from Lemma 29.
For Downward-Validity, after the initial round, the input value of each correct process
i must be contained in the safe value set of each correct process j for i, by property 1 of
Gradecast. Then, by Lemma 26(2), the input value of i remains in Vi. Thus, xi ≤ yi.
For Non-Triviality, after the initial round, by property of the Gradecast algorithm,
since only values with score at least 1 are included into the safe value set, each Byzantine
process can only introduce one value into the initial safe value set. Then, we have SF 0G0 ⊆
unionsq({xi | i ∈ C} ∪ B), where B ⊂ X and |B| ≤ f . For each correct i, from Lemma 27, we
have V logni ⊆ SF 0G0 . Thus, yi = unionsq{v ∈ V logni } ≤ unionsq({xi | i ∈ C} ∪ B), where B ⊂ X and
|B| ≤ f . J
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I Corollary 30. There is a 4 logn+4 rounds algorithm for the authenticated Byzantine lattice
agreement problem in synchronous systems which can tolerate f < n2 Byzantine failures,
where n is the number of processes in the system. The algorithm takes O(n2 logn) messages.
5 Conclusion
We have presented two algorithms for the Byzantine lattice agreement problem in synchronous
systems. The first algorithm takes at most min{3h(X) + 6, 6√f + 6} rounds and has early
stopping property. The second algorithm takes 3 logn + 3 rounds. For future work, the
following questions are interesting.
1) Can we improve the upper bound or prove some lower bound on the round complexity?
There does not exist any lower bound for the lattice agreement problem at all, even in the
crash failure model.
2) The paper [24] and [23] have improved the upper bound to be O(log f) rounds for the
lattice agreement problem in crash failure model, can their techniques be applied for the
Byzantine failure model?
3) Can our techniques in this paper be applied to the Byzantine lattice agreement problem
in asynchronous systems?
4) Can we improve the message complexity?
5) Is there an algorithm for the authenticated Byzantine lattice agreement problem which
can tolerate any number of failures and takes less than f + 1 rounds? It is known to be
impossible for the authenticated Byzantine agreement problem [9].
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